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Lawyer-Versus-Lawyer Litigation: Is There an
Alternative?
In an era of intensified competition and more business-like behavior
within the legal profession, many lawyers have shed more than their kid
gloves. . . . At the same time, battles over money, power, policy, and
strategy are more common, more strident, and more likely to create per-
manent rifts than in days past when partnerships were for life. In a
word, the law firm divorce rate is burgeoning-as is the whole role of
attorneys for the lawyers getting divorced.1
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been an explosion in the number of state and federal civil
case filings in the United States during the 1980's. Not surprisingly, law-
yer-versus-lawyer litigation has also increased significantly during this
period. As a result, a movement has recently begun among city and state
bar associations to establish programs of alternative dispute resolution to
address the increasing number of intra-attorney disputes. These pro-
grams have been developed to combat the high costs and long delays
historically associated with the litigation process, and to protect clients
and attorneys' ongoing work. The disputing attorneys, the clients whom
they represent, and the judicial system stand to profit from the increased
use of these cost and time efficient private dispute resolution programs.
The characteristics of these lawyer dispute resolution programs vary
both in procedure and substance. For instance, some of the programs
offer mediation as an alternative to the arbitration process, while in
others, mediation is a prerequisite. Moreover, several programs provide a
select group of experienced arbitrators and mediators for participants in
the program. These programs vary to a great extent, and although some
are more technically advanced than others, their common goal is to ad-
vocate a cost effective process to solve disputes between attorneys, while
at the same time relieving the already overburdened court system of ad-
ditional time-consuming litigation.
i. Graham, Can Ugly Litigation Be Avoided When Firms Undergo Divorce?, Legal
Times, Oct. 8, 1984, at 1.
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II. LAW FIRM BREAKUPS - A DISTURBING TREND
The increasing number of disputes between lawyers is directly related
to the growing number of law firm "divorces" (breakups or dissolutions)
in the United States. Law firms breakup or dissolve for a myriad of rea-
sons. Each divorce differs to some extent depending on factors unique to
the attorneys involved. While an exhaustive list of reasons is beyond the
focus of this Note, an analysis of several of the more prominent reasons
for law firm breakups will aid in understanding the need for, and useful-
ness of, arbitration and mediation programs geared towards settling dis-
putes between lawyers.
Partnership agreements have traditionally consisted of a lifetime com-
mitment, until death or retirement, by the partners. In today's legal soci-
ety, however, the ease and regularity in which partners can move from
one firm to another is a leading reason why law firms breakup and dis-
solve.2 This lateral mobility can be extremely devastating to a law firm
when a group of partners, not just individuals, leave the partnership.3
These mass breakaways have forced law firms into crisis management. 4
The law firms are forced to handle these "divorces" with a minimum
amount of damage to client rosters, ongoing services, reputations, and
morale.5 Moreover, when a key partner or partners leave, the firm may
lose profitable work, find itself with a void in a certain area of practice,
or even worse, be forced to dissolve.6
The recent story of Demov Morris, a fifty-two attorney New York law
firm, is an example of the devastating effects the departure of a key part-
ner can have upon the entire law firm. Richard Weidman, a partner spe-
cializing in real estate, brought large clients such as Citibank and Chem-
ical Bank to this law firm. As a result, Mr. Weidman's reputation grew
and more clients sought to retain him. However, Demov Morris' size and
limited resources prevented the firm from handling these sizeable
projects that required heavy staffing.7
In February 1987, Mr. Weidman left Demov Morris for a larger New
York law firm. In the process, he took $3.5 million in annual business,
approximately twenty percent of the firm's revenue, and twenty-five of
2. Hildebrandt, Is Dissolution the Answer When Law Firms Break Up?, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 10, 1987, at 4.
3. Committee Rep., Proposal for Association-Sponsored Arbitration of Disputes
Among Lawyers, 42 Rec. N.Y.C. B.A. 877 (Dec. 1987) (quoting Graham, Bustin' Loose:
How Abruptly Must Partners Go? Legal Times, Dec. 10, 1984, at 2).
4. Hildebrandt, supra note 2.
5. Committee Rep., supra note 3, at 877-78.
6. Hildebrandt, supra note 2.
7. Dockser, Midsize Law Firms Struggle to Survive, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1988, at BI.
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the firm's attorneys with him. Demov Morris failed to find enough new
attorneys or a suitable merger to fill the void. Within a month, another
prominent partner left Demov Morris and took most of the remaining
attorneys. Shortly thereafter, due to the increased lateral mobility among
partners, Demov Morris was dissolved. 8
In addition to the problems associated with lateral mobility, another
reason for the increased number of law firm breakups is the fact that
midsize corporate law firms, consisting of approximately fifteen to one
hundred attorneys, are struggling to survive.9 The problems facing mid-
size law firms stem from changing economics and changing values in the
legal community. Squeezed by rising costs, many midsize law firms, such
as Demov Morris, are forced to seek more profitable work, which usually
entails attracting major companies as clients. These law firms, however,
cannot afford to provide the human and technological resources needed
by large corporate clients.1"
A less cordial business ethic has also evolved in recent years which has
led to a number of midsize law firm breakups. Large firms are searching
for lateral hires. As a result, they are raiding entire departments of mid-
size law firms. When a midsize law firm loses a partner, as in the case of
Demov Morris, the clients usually follow." One study found that within
a recent two year period, more than sixty midsize firms, greater than ten
percent of the nationwide total, either dissolved or merged.'2 Midsize law
firms make up ten percent of all law firms, however, they accounted for
twenty-five percent of the field's closings and mergers in recent years."
Disputes concerning firm management, profits and expenses, and
clashes of personalities and egos are other common reasons for law firm
divorces. Many law firms breakup or dissolve over disagreements on
whether to expand. 4 Additionally, firms that expand too rapidly or enter
into a noncompatible merger are often susceptible to dissolution.'8 The
above were all contributing factors in the highly publicized dissolution of
the fourth largest law firm in the United States, Finley, Kumble, Wag-
ner, Underberg, Manley, Myerson, & Casey.'"
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
-14. Committee Rep., supra note 3, at 877.
15. Moss. When Partners Split, Pa. Law., June 1988, at 9.
16. Jensen. Scenes from a Breakup, Nat'l L. J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 1, col. 1. Mismanage-
ment, personality disputes, power struggles, media attention, banks, overspending, over-
expansion, and greedy leaders were all factors that led to the demise of Finley, Kumble,
Wagner, Underberg, Manley, Myerson, & Casey. At the time of dissolution, Finley, Kum-
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There is also increased emphasis on the law firm as a business. Today,
partners are being scrutinized on how well they manage their practices.
This emphasis on the bottom line puts a strain on partner relationships
and weakens the bonds of professional collegiality.17 In addition, client
loyalties are also waning. There is a growing tendency for clients to
spread work among different law firms. This is causing many firms to
measure the impact of client dependencies and to adjust their entities'
structures accordingly. In turn, these firms are searching for lateral
hires, mergers, or acquisitions."8 Finally, many partners have cited burn-
out and increased compensation potential in other employment areas as
major reasons for leaving the profession. 19
III. PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS: THE KEY TO AVOIDING DISPUTES
The nonexistence or ineffectiveness of a law firm's partnership agree-
ment, or corporate regulations, is an important reason why so many law-
yers fail to resolve their differences with other partners in a reasonable
and amicable manner.20 In a profession that demands the utmost techni-
cal precision in order to protect client interests, it is ironic that about
one-half of the law firms in the United States operate without a partner-
ship agreement to govern the affairs of the firm and the relationships
among the partners. 21 Some reasons for not having a partnership agree-
ment include the following: (1) the partners get along with each other
and any problems that arise can be settled on an ad hoc basis; (2) the
partners cannot agree to the terms of the agreement; and (3) the part-
ners simply do not have the time nor the energy needed to develop such a
crucial working document.22
Items commonly disputed by attorneys involved in a law firm breakup
include resignation payments, accounts receivable, work-in-progress (es-
pecially contingent fees), 2' noncompete clauses, notices of withdrawal,
and capital contributions. Additionally, the value of the law firm's lease
ble had 245 partners, 2000 associates and staff members, and an astonishing debt of $83
million. Id. at 46.
17. Hildebrandt, supra note 2.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Santangelo & Malone, Partnership Agreements: Don't Dance Around the Issues,
TRIAL, April 1988, at 58.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Kahn, Some Practical Aspects of Law Firm Dissolution or Break-Up, 16 COLO.
LAW. 1419, 1420 (1987).
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is a major source of dispute,24 as are retirement benefits, such as pension
and profit sharing plans.25 If these areas of dispute are not addressed in
the partnership agreement, they have the potential of providing for a
large reservoir of litigation.
The importance of a clear, concise, and workable document is never
truly understood until the partners in a law firm are faced with a
breakup or dissolution. Although not a cure-all, a written agreement is
helpful because many issues will be foreclosed from dispute by the docu-
ment.26 According to Bradford W. Hildebrandt and Robert Weil, nation-
wide law firm consultants, a clear partnership agreement will smooth the
departure of defecting partners while also protecting the interests of the
firm in a currently volatile market. 7 "Like a good constitution, it should
require only occasional amendment."28
IV. DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAMS
Several dispute resolution programs have been developed throughout
the country within the last few years in response to the problems associ-
ated with law firm breakups and inadequate or nonexistent partnership
agreements. These programs offer mediation and/or arbitration to law-
yers who are either involved in fee disputes, internal disputes or law firm
breakups.2 9 Programs that mediate or arbitrate disputes between lawyers
have been likened to a form of internal damage control. The disputes are
contained within the law firm rather than being exposed to the public
and to the media. Further, these programs minimize damage to the indi-
24. Zeldis, Clear Agreements Key to Avoiding Suit, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 19, 1987, at 6, col.
2.
25. Kahn, supra note 23, at 1421. See Metanas, Paying for a Partner's Departure, Nat'l
L.J., Feb. 17, 1986, at 1.
26. Kahn, supra note 23, at 1419.
27. Zeldis, supra note 24.
28. Id. (quoting R. Weil). Many partnership agreements are old and vague, often dating
back to the founding of the firm. These agreements are of little help in resolving issues.
Firms should re-evaluate their agreements periodically to update old issues. Zeldis, Firms
Differ on the Value of Partnership Agreements, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 19, 1987, at 1, col. 4; 6,
col. 2.
29. The Los Angeles County Bar Association and the Massachusetts Bar Association
have dispute resolution programs geared solely towards settling fee disputes. The Cleveland
Bar Association, the New Hampshire Bar Association, the Bar Association of San Fran-
cisco and the Denver Bar Association arbitrate law firm breakups. For a related discussion
concerning law firm breakups, see Terry, Ethical Pitfalls and Malpractice Consequences
of Law Firm Breakups, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1055 (1988). The bar associations of Connecti-
cut, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
and North Carolina have contacted the Pennsylvania Bar Association for information re-
garding the PBA program.
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
vidual parties. The expertise and experience of the mediator/arbitrator
can be used to anticipate and resolve problems before the harm becomes
irreparable.30
In mediation, a neutral third party, who is powerless to impose out-
comes, assists the disputants' efforts to negotiate a mutually acceptable
resolution to a problem, whose solution has eluded the disputants them-
selves. The mediator helps to narrow issues, acts as a sounding board,
defuses hostility, facilitates communication, and recommends arbitration
if necessary. As a professional conflict manager, the mediator can
"translate" offers and responses in neutral words that the parties can
evaluate on their merits. The parties maintain sovereignty over their in-
terests and have no obligation to concede or agree to anything.3
Arbitration is the process of submitting a disagreement to one or more
impartial persons who render a binding decision. Due to its binding na-
ture, arbitration differs from mediation, where the third party simply
brings the disputants together to discuss settlement opportunities. For-
mal rules of evidence and procedure are not used in arbitration. The
arbitrator assigns to each party the burden of proof necessary to pre-
vail.32 Both arbitration and mediation are usually private dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms.3
3
Agreements on complex issues of valuation of a firm's assets, the col-
lection probability of its accounts, and the division of unbilled time and
receivables come with greater ease and lower cost when a neutral, third
party expert helps settle the dispute.34 Additionally, the mediator or ar-
bitrator can act as an equalizer when there is a power imbalance. Fi-
nally, although the mediator or arbitrator is precluded from acting as
legal counsel for either party, the mediator or arbitrator may identify
legal and other issues that exist and may recommend that each side ob-
tain appropriate professional advice.3 5
Two recently developed dispute resolution systems for attorney dis-
putes will be analyzed in this Note. Both the Pennsylvania Bar Associa-
tion36 and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 37 have
established detailed dispute resolution programs. The objectives of the
30. Moss, supra note 15, at 12.
3 1. Committee Rep., Association-Sponsored Mediation and Arbitration of Disputes Be-
tween Lawyers, as amended May 15, 1989. 43 Rec. N.Y.C. B.A. 981, 985 (Dec. 1988)
[hereinafter ABCNY Rules].
32. Creo, Pennsylvania Bar Association Lawyer Dispute Resolution Program, to be
published in Pa. Law., draft version at 7.
33. R. COULSON. BUSINESS ARBITRATION - WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 8 (1986).
34. Moss, supra note 15, at 12.
35. Id. at 12-13.
36. Penn. B.A. Lawyer Dispute Resolution Program Rules, [hereinafter PBA Rules], as
amended Nov. 1989 [hereinafter PBA Rules].
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two programs are the same: to provide quick, inexpensive and fair means
to resolve attorney-related disputes, while introducing participants to
new forms of dispute resolution. The provisions of these two programs
are similar in many respects, but differ on several key issues.
A. Eligibility for Use of Programs
The Pennsylvania Bar Association's (PBA) program, officially titled
"The Lawyer Dispute Resolution Program," offers mediation or media-
tion followed by arbitration to attorneys involved in disputes concerning
law firm dissolutions, departures of one or more attorneys from a law
firm, disputes between attorneys who are in the same firm and intend to
stay there,38 and the allocation of fees between attorneys in different law
firms.3 9 The PBA, as administrator of the program, reserves the right to
decline jurisdiction over the matter when, in the opinion of the mediator
or arbitrator, the dispute involves either a non-attorney party or a proba-
ble violation of law or Rules of Professional Conduct.40
The Association of the Bar of the city of New York's (ABCNY) pro-
gram, which is administered by the Cbrmmittee on Arbitration and Alter-
native Dispute Resolution, arbitrates or mediates any dispute if four con-
ditions are met. First, the dispute must be solely between lawyers and
arise out of their professional or contractual relationship relating to the
practice of law or to the facilities for such practice.41 Second, if the dis-
pute is between an employer and a purely salaried employee, it must be
a preexisting dispute which is being submitted by the parties pursuant to
a submission agreement.4 2 Third, the dispute must involve at least one
economic issue.4 3 Finally, at least one of the parties to the dispute must
either reside or maintain an office for the practice of law in the city of
New York."
37. ABCNY Rules, 43 Rec. N.Y.C. B.A. 981, 984 (Dec. 1988). The ABCNY rules
were amended as of May 15, 1989.
38. The PBA does not believe many internal disputes concerning the division of the eco-
nomic interests and management responsibilities of a law firm will be submitted to binding
arbitration. Equity holders will likely be reluctant to turn over their autonomy to an out-
sider. Mediation may be a more appropriate resolution mechanism for these disputes. Creo,
supra note 32, at 3.
39. PBA Rules § (A)(2). The PBA program provides that the rules of the Pennsylvania
Uniform Arbitration Act shall be used to resolve the disputes. PBA Rules § (C)(28).
40. PBA Rules § (A)(2).
41. ABCNY Rules § (2)(a)(i).
42. Id. at § (2)(a)(ii).
43. Id.
44. Id. at § (2)(a)(iv). Disputants need not be a member of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York to use the program. Committee Rep., supra note 31, at 982. To
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B. The Mediator/Arbitrator
Mediators and arbitrators for the PBA are appointed from separate
panels established by the PBA.45 These panels currently consist of six-
teen mediators and seventeen arbitrators46 selected to provide balance
among geographic location and areas of expertise, such as business law,
accounting and firm management.4 7 The panel members in the PBA re-
ceive skills training and instruction in different aspects of law firm disso-
lution, such as tax consequences, ethical issues and management
problems.48 The PBA ordinarily encourages the use of one mediator or
arbitrator. However, co-mediation or tripartite arbitration boards are
permissible if all parties agree.49
The PBA also requires that a mediator on a particular case may not'
serve as the arbitrator on the same case. The mediator and arbitrator are
prohibited from communicating with each other about the case when it
is pending." At the conclusion of the mediation, the mediator may ob-
tain written stipulations in order to certify unresolved issues for
arbitration. 1
The ABCNY maintains two panels consisting of mediators and arbi-
trators. These panels consist of experienced lawyers who have been ad-
mitted to the New York Bar for ten years or more.5 2 Unless otherwise
agreed by the parties, each case will be handled by one mediator.53 The
parties may either appoint the mediator, have the ABCNY appoint the
mediator in strict rotation from the established panel, or provide for any
other method of appointment.54
The parties have a choice of one or three arbitrators and may provide
for the method of appointment of the arbitrators pursuant to ABCNY
guidelines. The ABCNY will determine if there should be one or three
arbitrators if no decision can be reached by the parties.5 5 The selection
settle the disputes, the ABCNY has incorporated the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association into its program. ABCNY Rule § (5).
45. PBA Rules § (A)(6). Only one arbitrator or mediator will be assigned for each
dispute unless the parties agree otherwise. Id. at (B)(2), (C)(7). Unlike mediation, where
the mediator(s) is appointed by the PBA, the disputants may select the arbitrator(s) from
the panels. Id. at (B)(2), (C)(6).
46. Creo, supra note 32, at 4.
47. Moss, supra note 15, at 10.
48. Id.
49. Creo, supra note 32, at 6.
50. PBA Rules § (A)(6).
51. Id. at § (A)(6).
52. ABCNY Rules § (8)(c).
53. Id. at § (8)(a).
54. Id. at § (8)(b).
55. Id. at § (8)(a).
[Vol. 5:2 1990]
LAWYER v. LAWYER
of arbitrators is similar to the selection of mediators in the ABCNY pro-
gram. If three arbitrators are used, each party may select one with the
ABCNY selecting the third arbitrator.86 The ABCNY will select all
three arbitrators if necessary.5- 7
, The two programs differ as to whether a written decision by the arbi-
trator is necessary. Although the PBA program requires the award to be
in writing, a written opinion will not accompany the award, unless re-
quested by one of the parties.5 8 In contrast, the ABCNY program re-
quires that the award must be accompanied by a reasoned opinion, un-
less otherwise agreed by the parties.59 Due to the private nature of the
proceedings, both the PBA and the ABCNY provide that the mediation
and arbitration sessions will be confidential.60
C. Mediation Requirement
The most striking difference between the PBA and the ABCNY pro-
grams concerns the requirement of mediation as a prerequisite to arbi-
tration. The PBA program requires that all parties, before submitting
their disputes to PBA arbitration, attend at least one mediation session
conducted through the PBA program.61 On the other hand, the ABCNY
does not have such a requirement. Instead, the ABCNY provides the
mediation option-as a usually less intrusive, but not mandatory, alterna-
tive to arbitration in the resolution of disputes among attorneys.62
The PBA requirement that the disputing lawyers use at least one me-
diation session before moving into arbitration is unique. The organizers
of the PBA program insisted on the mediation requirement to solve the
dispute, or at least narrow the issues for arbitration. 3 Further, because
mediation is a relatively new dispute resolution technique in the United
States, the organizers hope the exposure of the mediation process to law-
yers will increase its popularity and use in other types of civil disputes.
56. Id. at § (8)(b). Both the PBA and ABCNY arbitrator selection methods avoid the
potential problems associated with biased party-appointed arbitrators. The arbitrators must
disclose any conflict of interest or any circumstances likely to create a presumption of bias
in favor of the selecting party. PBA Rules § (B)(3), (C)(9). ABCNY Rules § (I1)(5),
incorporating AMERICAN BAR AssoCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES Rule 19
(1988).
57. ABCNY Rules § (8)(b)(iii).
58. PBA Rules § (C)(32).
59. ABCNY Rules § (15).
60. PBA Rules § (B)(13), (C)(29). ABCNY Rules § (1).
61. PBA Rules § (C)(4).
62. Committee Rep., supra note 31, at 984.
63. Moss, supra note 15, at 13.
64. Id.
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D. Compensation and Expenses
The avoidance of excessive legal fees was a major reason for the im-
plementation of these dispute resolution programs. Both programs re-
quire that a small administrative fee be paid by the participants in the
programs. 65 The compensation provided to the mediators and arbitrators
varies depending on the program. The PBA requires that the mediators
and arbitrators serve for $500 per day (plus travel expenses). This rate
of reimbursement is well below the usual daily rates for such experienced
attorneys. 6
The fees provided to the mediators and arbitrators for the ABCNY
program are reasonable when compared to the legal costs of extended
litigation in the city of New York. The ABCNY provides that an hourly
rate of not less than $150 and not more than $250 be provided to the
mediators and arbitrators, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. 7
V. EFFECTIVENESS AND FUTURE OF THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROGRAMS
At the present time, the success of these dispute resolution programs,
designed to aid the legal community, cannot easily be determined. The
PBA and the ABCNY programs have just recently been established and
neither program has entertained a significant number of disputes. The
organizers acknowledge the very recent enactment of the programs as
the main reason for the low participation levels.6 8 Only after these pro-
grams have been in use for several years will it be possible to determine
the impact on the legal community.
Although programs such as those of the PBA and ABCNY are still in
their infancy stages, increased attorney participation in these programs
in the future will benefit many different parties. First, the lawyers them-
selves will profit through the use of these programs because the financial
and emotional strain of a long, drawn out fight with former partners can
be alleviated. Second, the judicial system is benefited each time a dispute
is settled by means other than through litigation. Third, through the use
of arbitration and/or mediation, lawyers can focus their attention upon
65. The PBA requires that each party pay an administrative fee of $50 if at least one
party is a member of the PBA, or $125 if neither party is a PBA member. PBA Rules §
(A)(5). To institute proceedings using the ABCNY program, the parties must pay a total
administrative fee of $150. ABCNY Rules (App.)(Note to claimant).
66. Moss, supra note 15, at 10.
67. ABCNY Rules § (III)(11).
68. Moss, supra note 15, at 12.
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the needs of their clients much sooner than if they were involved in pro-
tracted litigation with another attorney.
When law firm breakups and dissolutions result in litigation, the par-
ticipating lawyers can expect an experience of the costliest, most emo-
tionally draining nature. 9 Not only do the lawyers' checkbooks suffer,
these divorces can have detrimental effects on the lawyers' reputations
and practices.7 0 Adverse publicity and the loss of clients, due to time
consuming legal battles with others in the profession, have destroyed the
practices of many respected lawyers.7 1
The time and money spent by attorneys involved in protracted litiga-
tion can prove disastrous. One prominent Philadelphia attorney who han-
dles lawyer-versus-lawyer cases charged fees ranging from $50,000 to
more than $100,000. In many cases, these were not the final costs as-
sessed to the attorneys but only interim charges.7 Another attorney,
from the law firm of Shea & Gould in New York, notified his lawyer-
clients that one withdrawal would cost approximately $1 million. The
lawyer-clients fired the attorney for suggesting that they settle. These
particular lawyer-clients litigated their dispute for over six years. A simi-
lar dispute between two feuding attorneys was litigated for more than
eleven years.7"
If the costs alone are not prohibitive, the time spent in litigation can
be detrimental to the practices of the lawyers involved. Delays attendant
to the overcrowded court system only prolong the ordeal facing the attor-
neys and can virtually eliminate the possibility of an equitable solution."4
Speed, confidentiality, low cost, the prospect of a fair, informed solution,
and the preservation of important relationships accrue to the benefit of
attorneys who can solve their disputes in a quick and inexpensive fashion
through the arbitration or mediation process.75
Additionally, a major carrier of professional liability insurance, the
Bertholon-Rowland Agencies, has agreed to grant a reduction of five per-
cent in malpractice premiums to Pennsylvania firms incorporating the
following clause into their partnership agreements (or bylaws):
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to the dissolution of
the partnership [corporation], or relating to a partner's [shareholder's]
withdrawal from the partnership [corporation], shall be settled through
mediation conducted in accordance with the then-existing rules of the
69. Id. at 9.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 12.
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Pennsylvania Bar Association Lawyer Dispute Resolution Program (the
"PBA Program"). Any issues that are not resolved through such media-
tion shall be submitted for arbitration conducted in accordance with the
then-existing rules of the PBA Program, and judgment upon the award
rendered may be entered in any Court having jurisdiction thereof."
A five percent reduction in malpractice premiums may prove very at-
tractive to partners who are looking for ways to reduce operating ex-
penses. As a result of this discount offer, the PBA program may experi-
ence increased participation levels several years from now when partners,
who have incorporated this clause into their partnership agreements, are
legally obligated to resolve their disputes through mediation or mediation
followed by arbitration. This will likely result in fewer malpractice
claims because the attorneys will be able to focus their energies upon the
needs of their clients much sooner than if their disputes were disposed of
through litigation.
The reputation of the entire legal profession suffers when attorneys fail
to settle disputes among themselves. The notion of lawyer-versus-lawyer
litigation is contrary to the concept that the lawyer's societal function is
to settle disputes. Highly publicized breakups of law firms such as Fin-
ley, Kumble, Wagner, Underberg, Manley, Myerson, & Casey, and the
litigation between former partners that follows, further detracts from the
eroding public image of the legal profession. 7 The legal community and
the attorneys involved will benefit from the use of arbitration and media-
tion programs because disputes are resolved in a private setting. The pri-
vate nature of these programs will significantly reduce adverse media
exposure of the disputes. 8
Although not every law firm breakup or dissolution results in disagree-
ment, partners quite often resort to hostile and protracted litigation
76. Letter from John E. Colburn, Sr., President of Bertholon-Rowland Agencies, to
Mary Hull, PBA program (July 18, 1988). Although no reduction in malpractice premi-
ums has been offered through use of the ABCNY program, its promoters suggest that
attorneys use contractual language similar to that of the PBA in drafting their partnership
agreements:
"Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement, or breach thereof,
shall be settled by arbitration under the Rules for Arbitration of Disputes between Lawyers
of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and judgment upon the award
rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof."
Committee Rep., supra note 31, at 983.
77. Public Image of Lawyers, 74 A.B.A. J. 46 (Nov. 1988); See Jensen, supra note 16.
78. Committee Rep., supra note 31, at 981-82.
"Not only is it unseemly for lawyers to engage in litigation among themselves; it betokens
an inability to adjust their conflicting interests short of litigation, and thus a failure to
fulfill one of their most important societal functions when faced with conflict among them-
selves. Media exposure of litigation between lawyers can only erode further the public im-
age of the-profession."
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rather than an amicable, negotiated termination of their partnership re-
lationship.79 Litigation among lawyers can only increase the problems
facing the public and the judicial system. It is well-documented that the
court system in the United States is severely overburdened."0 Civil
caseloads almost doubled in the ten year period ending in 1985.1 The
number of civil case filings grew in excess of four percent per year dur-
ing this period, which was four times the rate of the population growth in
the United States.82 This overwhelming caseload poses a threat to the
quality of court-rendered decisions.8 3 Lawyer-versus-lawyer disputes set-
tled through private arbitration and/or mediation will help reduce the
civil case docket.
Litigation arising due to law firm divorces may have a great impact on
clients as well as the judicial system. The clients of the attorneys in-
volved in the litigation have been likened to children over whom custody
battles are fought in divorce cases.84 A negative impact on the clients
may result from the disruption or distraction of the lawyers as they
center their attention towards their own litigation. Clients are addition-
ally affected because they need to make choices regarding their future
representation, and the possible unwillingness of the lawyers to complete
the client's representation. 5
The pertinent question is how many clients can a lawyer satisfy if all his
Saturdays, Sundays, and perhaps Mondays and Tuesdays, too, are going
into his own litigation. How much creative energy can he spare for a
client's problems? At best, the distraction cuts into billable hours; at
worst, it may result in client defections and rising malpractice claims.8 6
The quality of services provided to clients is compromised with the
suddenness and intensity of the attorney's need to set up new office space
and staffing. 7 The fiduciary duties of partners involved in dissolutions,
and the relative compensation due partners completing work which re-
79. Committee Rep., supra note 3, at 878.
80. Marvell, Caseload Growth - Past and Future Trends, 71 JUDICATURE J. 151, 160
(1987). For the ten year period ending in 1985, state civil case filings grew at a rate of
48%. Id. From June 30, 1980 to June 30, 1985 the number of federal district court filings
increased from 188,487 to 299,169; a rate of 58.7%. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FED-
ERAL COURTS: DETERMINING THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL JUDGES (Jan. 1987). Between
95 % and 99% of civil cases are settled before jury verdicts are reached, however, the court
docket is still greatly backlogged. J. O'CONNELL THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY 84 (1979).
81. Marvell, supra note 81, at 160.
82. Id.
83. Justice Antonin Scalia, in speech before the ABA, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1987, § 1,
at I, col. I.
84. Committee Rep., supra note 3, at 879.
85. Id.
86. Moss, supra note 15, at 9.
87. Committee Rep., supra note 3, at 879.
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mains on pending matters, present very difficult financial and ethical is-
sues.88 The struggle between disputing partners can spill over into the
client's own litigation when questions of compensation, turning over files,
and retaining clients arise.
Attorneys involved in a law firm breakup may expose themselves to
serious ethical problems and costly malpractice claims. One commenta-
tor has suggested that in any one law firm breakup there are at least
seven groups of ethical regulations that may be violated by the feuding
attorneys. These include: (1) a lawyer's continuing obligation to the cli-
ent89; (2) restrictive covenants; (3) fees and fee division; (4) publicity
and client contact; (5) conflicts of interest; (6) confidentiality; and (7) a
lawyer's duty with respect to the safekeeping of property.90 The expedi-
tious nature of these arbitration and mediation programs enables lawyers
to turn their attention towards client matters much sooner than if they
were involved in their own time-consuming litigation, thus reducing the
chances of ethical violations and the possible malpractice actions that
may follow.
The most crucial problem these fledgling programs face is attracting
participants. The ABCNY program has not been as successful as origi-
nally anticipated. Since its inception in 1988, there has been only one
arbitration. According to one promoter, the principal reason for the
program's lack of success has been inadequate publication and market-
ing.92 In contrast, the PBA has attracted several participants to the pro-
gram by instituting a comprehensive publicity plan. The PBA publicized
its program through articles in several publications, national, state, and
local bar conferences, and a presentation at a state trial judges' confer-
ence (followed by a mailing to all state trial judges). The PBA antici-
pates generating a number of cases through judicial referrals.93
88. Committee Rep., supra note 3, at 879. See Terry, Ethical Pitfalls and Malpractice
Consequences of Law Firm Breakups, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 1055 (1988). See also Hillman,
Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law and Ethics of Grabbing and Leaving, 67 TEX. L.
REV. 1 (1988).
89. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 comment (1989). MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 2-109, 2-110 (1988).
90. Terry, Ethical Pitfalls and Malpractice Consequences of Law Firm Breakups, 61
TEMP. L. REV. 1055, 1065-66 (1988).
91. Letter from Berthold H. Hoeniger, Chair, ABCNY program, to Keith Rabenold
(Jan. 9, 1990) (discussing ABCNY program).
92. Letter from Berthold H. Hoeniger, Chair ABCNY program, to Keith Rabenold
(Feb. 14,1989) (discussing ABCNY program).
93. Letter from Robert M. Ackerman, Director, PBA program, to Keith Rabenold (Feb.
17, 1989) (discussing PBA program). The PBA has implemented a detailed publicity pro-
gram to increase awareness of, and use of, the PBA program. (PBA Publicity Plan-Short
Version).
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The organizers of the PBA program have been pleased with the per-
formance of the program. Since the establishment of the PBA program
in 1988, four cases have been completed and four cases are currently in
different stages of the mediation process. Of the four cases completed,
three concerned the departure of lawyers from their firms. In two of the
three attorney departure cases, the parties resolved all issues through
mediation. The third attorney departure case was resolved through arbi-
tration after the issues had been narrowed in a mediation session. 'the
fourth completed case concerned a fee dispute between attorneys and
was also settled through mediation. 4 The participants in the PBA pro-
gram have been satisfied with its substantive and procedural quality.
However, a high inquiries-to-cases is evidence that promoters are having
a difficult time "getting both parties in the room."9 5
Potential attorney-participants may shy away from these programs be-
cause the mediation process is so novel and misunderstood 8 One promi-
nent Philadelphia attorney-mediator, who often recommends mediation
to his clients, believes "they hear 'arbitration' [not mediation] and some-
how think they're going to be bound by a 'finding'."9" Education of the
legal community concerning the existence of these programs and the
benefits of mediation is necessary to increase participation levels.
Mediation is not a win or lose situation. Many people, including attor-
neys, do not realize that mediation is a process of simply trying to arrive
at a mutually agreeable solution to a dispute through a neutral third
party. 8 The mediator helps participants analyze the issues and exchange
their perceptions about relevant data in hopes of reaching some compro-
mise. The decision making authority rests in the participants. The medi-
ator simply facilitates communication. 9
The organizers of these programs understand that a successful alterna-
tive dispute resolution program may have to strike a compromise be-
tween pure models of mediation and arbitration, on the one hand, and
the need for successful marketing to lawyers' on the other hand. As an
94. Letter from Laurel Terry, Director of External Affairs for the PBA program, to
Keith Rabenold (Jan. 17, 1990).
95. Letter from Robert M. Ackerman, Director, PBA program, to Keith Rabenold (Feb.
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cases ratio:
"It would appear to be the old 'it takes two to tango' problem frequently experienced by
voluntary dispute resolution programs, compounded by the suspicion held by some lawyers
that 'if the other side wants it, it must be bad for our side;' i.e., the old win/lose mental-
ity." Id.
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example, the PBA program has held fast to the requirement of participa-
tion in at least one mediation session prior to arbitration. In the arbitra-
tion stage, however, the PBA program has acceded to the litigator's ex-
pectations by allowing a party to demand that a written opinion
accompany the arbitrator's award. 0 Through such compromise, promot-
ers will be able to attract lawyers accustomed to traditional litigation
practices, while exposing them to new, yet highly beneficial forms of al-
ternative dispute resolution.
VI. CONCLUSION
Programs for dispute resolution among lawyers, such as those spon-
sored by the Pennsylvania Bar Association and the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, will be an effective alternative to time-
consuming, expensive litigation. Attorneys, clients, and the judicial sys-
tem will all benefit from increased attorney participation in such alterna-
tive dispute resolution programs. However, the success of these programs
depends on several factors. The programs must, in fact, provide time-
saving, less expensive alternatives to litigation. The mediators and arbi-
trators involved must strive to provide fair and equitable solutions to the
problems disputed by lawyers. Law firms and partners must believe in
mediation and arbitration, and should incorporate the use of such pro-
grams into their partnership agreements or bylaws. Finally, proponents
of the alternative dispute resolution movement must continue to educate
the legal community on the tremendous benefits available to participants
who settle their disputes through arbitration or mediation.
Keith M. Rabenold
100. Letter from Robert M. Ackerman, Director, PBA program, to Keith Rabenold
(Feb. 17, 1989) (discussing PBA program).
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